F-20 Sales

At the time of the launch of the F-5G in January 1980 a total of 17 customers for 1236 aircraft were identified. 'Core 1' customers were the four in the near-term with the largest requirement. 'Core 2' customers were those of lesser quantities or farther out. Those already operating F-5E's, some with coproduction in place that could be transitioned to the F-5G, are indicated by asterisks.

Core 1:

• Taiwan - 80 aircraft requirement (F-5E coproduction in place). Taiwan needed a fighter capable of firing the Sparrow AIM-7 radar-guided missile. Taiwan had rejected an Israeli offer of Kfir C-2 aircraft for the Taiwanese fighter requirement, even though the US had given Israel clearance to sell the aircraft with the American General Electric J79 engine. Taiwan instead wanted F-4 aircraft, or eventually F-16 or F-18L fighters. None of these were acceptable to the US State Department, which saw even an early model F-4 as detrimental to negotiations with the People's Republic of China. This led the US Department of Defense to ask Northrop to look at adapting the F-5E, already produced under license in Taiwan, to carry the AIM-7. . But the basic F-5E equipped with the AIM-7 and with a radar similar to that used on the F-16A suffered such performance degradation that the Taiwanese were not interested in it. Therefore, since Northrop was already looking at difference engine combinations for a higher performance. Chronology of the Taiwan sale:
  • July 1978: Taiwan initial defense study concluded by Northrop. The F-5G was in this study Northrop as a single-F404 engine version of the F-5 capable of firing the Sparrow AIM-7 radar-guided missile. Two radars were under consideration - a version of the F-16 radar with a smaller antenna to fit in the F-5 nose, and a new design proposed by Emerson Electric, which made the existing ranging radar for the F-5E.
  • July 1978: Briefing to General Ahern, US Air Force, on the F-5G concept by Northrop's Paul Holliday. The US Air Force expresses interest in the F-5G for Taiwan.
  • October 1978 : Carter vetoes F-5G for Taiwan. This position was informally reversed after Northrop agreed to support the Carter administration's SALT-II treaty.
  • January 1979: Northrop NB 79-11 Family of Tigers report issued, which compared the F-5G to the F-4E(S) and threat aircraft A through M. Coons prepared the report for presentation to Taiwan and Korea.
  • May 1979: Taiwan briefing - NB 79-89 - F-5G radar capability by Northrop engineer Jerry Hill.
  • January 1980: Northrop begins the F-5G development program, based on a very high confidence that a Letter of Agreement for the Taiwan order would be signed by the end of 1980. In fact, the Carter administration, preoccupied with a myriad of foreign crises and the upcoming election, deferred a decision to 1981.
  • August 1980: Response to Taiwan Request for Information (Price and Reliability data) issued.
  • January 1982: Reagan publicly vetoes the Taiwan F-5G sale, removing the F-5G from contention in Taiwan.
  • May 1982: General Dynamics secretly is authorized to begin development of the Taiwan Indigenous Defense Fighter as a replacement for the F-5G.
  • July 1983: Original target for first Tigershark delivery to Taiwan.
  • July 1984: Original date for first avionics aircraft delivery in original Taiwan program.
  • May 1989: First flight of the Ching Kuo Taiwan indigenous fighter aircraft.
  • September 1991: Production of Ching Kuo cut back to 130 aircraft after Bush Administration agrees to sell AIM-7 Sparrow-armed F-16A aircraft to Taiwan.
• South Korea - 200 aircraft requirement (F-5E coproduction in place): Korea was seen in 1980 as a longer-term customer, with the existing Korean F-5E production line transitioning to the F-5G. Korea remained the most important potential launch customer after the Taiwan sale was blocked, even after further development of the F-20 was discontinued in November 1986. Ultimately revelation of a bribery scandal ended any chance for a Korean Tigershark in 1988. Korea selected the F-18 for its requirement in 1989, only to abandon that in 1991 and finally settle on the F-16C.

  At the end of 1982 South Korea was already committed to buy 36 F-16's but that order could still be canceled at little cost. It was hoped a substantial coproduction contract for the F-20 would prove more attractive in terms of benefit to Korean industry.

  The first flight by a South Korean flight of an F-20 proved truly embarrassing. It was the first demonstration of GI1001 to a Korean pilot. Northrop was eager to demonstrate the stored heading alignment feature of its laser-gyro inertial navigation system. (INS).. Conventional INS took three to five minutes between power on and when the aircraft could start rolling. This was due to the gyroscopes having to warm up, followed by several minutes of alignment, during which the INS sensed the earth's rotation and thereby determined true north. The laser gyros of the F-20 required no warm-up, and the INS remembered its last heading and position on shut down. Therefore, if the aircraft was not moved after shutdown, the INS should know exactly where it was immediately on power up, and could begin rolling immediately in a scramble-alert situation.

  In the Korean demonstration, the Northrop pilot had brought the aircraft in, stored the alignment, and shut the aircraft down. The Korean pilot got into the cockpit, and the Northrop pilot, sanding on the ladder, carefully explained the controls and displays one last time prior to the Korean's first flight. The Korean duly took off, flew his demonstration sortie, and landed. But the INS showed a position 7 miles from the true runway position. It was decided that the motion and weight of the Northrop pilot on the ladder must have gently nudged the aircraft away from its stored heading, resulting in the big error by the end of the demonstration flight.

  Chronology of events:

  • January 1979: NB 79-11 Family of Tigers report issued, which compared the F-5G to the F-4E(S) and threat aircraft A through M. Coons prepared the report for presentation to Taiwan and Korea.
  • April 1979: Thailand and Korea briefings by Blood, comparing the F-5G to the F-5E, F-4E, and threat aircraft A+.
  • May 1979: Korea briefing - NB 79-90 - F-5G radar capability by Northrop engineer Jerry Hill.
  • August 1983: Korea Request for Information . The proposal was to cover comprehensive development of aerospace industry and initiation of a Korean F-X program.
  • October 17-19, 1983: Demonstration flights of GG1001 by Korean pilots.
  • October 10, 1984: GG1001 crashed at Suwon Air Base in South Korea during a tactical performance demonstration. Northrop Chief Test Pilot Darrell E Cornell was killed. The demonstration was being performed before South Korean military officials, including the Chief of Staff of the Korean Air Force.
  • March 1985: Korea - Advanced Fighter Aircraft Development program, NB 85-99 briefed.
  • July 1985: Official report of GG1001 crash in Korea issued, finding no aircraft malfunction.
  • April 1986: Korea - Price and availability proposal for 120 aircraft.
  • September 1986: Korean offset proposal submitted.
  • December 1986: Continued negotiations with Korea. The would take over the F-20 work in process and drawing package as the basis for an indigenous aircraft industry. However Northrop had terminated further F-20 development the month before.
  • 1988: F-20 removed from further consideration after a multi-million dollar bribery scandal involving the former Korean President.
  • 1989: F-18 announced as aircraft selected for Korean requirement.
  • 1991: F-18 decision reversed 'on cost grounds' and 'due to end of the Cold War' and F-16 selected instead.
  • December 1994: First of 120 co-produced F-16C/D delivered.
  • August 2002: First flight of prototype T-50 Golden Eagle trainer/fighter, powered by a single F404 engine.
  • September 2003: First flight of the prototype A-50 combat version of the T-50.
  • 2009: Planned first deliveries of the A-50.
• Turkey - 100 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). Turkey was looking for a large-scale aircraft coproduction program to develop their aviation industry under the auspices of the state-owned TUSAS firm. A German seed-funded coproduction agreement was expected to materialize in late 1983. Turkey had set up Tusas to handle coproduction on what would be a $2 billion program. The original letter of offer requested was for 291 F-16 or F-18 aircraft. By late 1982 Turkey was being more realistic, looking at an initial order of 40. The Turks were now studying pricing data for 40 F-18s and 60, 120, and 180 F-20s. However the F-16C/D was still an option. In the end the Turks selected the F-16C/D. The first coproduced F-16C was delivered in May 1987.
• Egypt - 80 aircraft requirement. Egypt operated primarily Soviet aircraft, although it was to receive 42 F-16A/B aircraft under the Camp David peace agreement. Egypt finally selected the F-16C/D, receiving 87 aircraft in three tranches from August 1986 to 1994.

Core 2:

• Bahrain - 12 aircraft requirement. Bahrain in fact made the first firm order for the F-20 November 1982 and flew the aircraft in December 1983. After the cancellation they instead took delivery of 12 F-16C/D from March 1990.
• Thailand - 18 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). Thailand was briefed on the F-5G in July 1979. In the end they selected the F-16A/B, with 18 delivered beginning June 1988 and 18 delivered from September 1995.
• Singapore - 24 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). Singapore (with strong interest) was actively considering the F-20 at the end of 1982. Instead they received 8 F-16A/b from February 1988 and 18 F-16C/D from March 1998.
• Indonesia - 16 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). In 1983 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had specifically recommended against the F-16 for Indonesia, believing it had excess capability and that the F-20 would be more appropriate. Indonesia finally received 12 F-16A/B from December 1989.
• Malaysia - 16 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). They eventually purchased 19 MiG-29 fighters in the 1990's.
• Spain - 72 aircraft requirement (F-5E coproduction). Instead they selected the F-18 on 30 May 1983.
• Pakistan - 124 aircraft requirement. An initial order of 40 F-16A/B were received beginning January 1983. A follow-on order for 71 was embargoed after their nuclear test.
• Switzerland - 50 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). They ultimately selected the F-18.
• Greece - 100 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). Instead they ordered 40 Mirage 2000 and F-16C/D's in two tranches - 40 from November 1988, and 40 from March 1997.
• Netherlands - 110 aircraft requirement (F-5A and F-16A coproduction). Instead 52 additional F-16A/B were delivered beginning in 1988.
• Norway - 50 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). No additional aircraft were ever purchased.
• Austria - 24. The 'Austrian sale' was a standing joke among aerospace corporations. They finally operated surplus Swedish Draken and Swiss F-5E aircraft in the 1990's. Eurofighter Typhoons were finally purchased. It was to be the Austrian Air Force's first new fighter aircraft in fifty years, if their planned delivery in 2009 was not reversed…
• Nigeria - 24. No new aircraft were ever purchased.
• Jordan - 48 aircraft requirement (F-5E operator). During 1982 the Reagan Administration was backing the F-20 in some cases over the F-16 in Northrop's' attempts to sell the aircraft. Flight test performance showed the aircraft were aerodynamically equal. The flyaway cost was not too different, but most countries could get three F-20's for the cost of two F-16's in terms of total acquisition cost.

  The Joint Chiefs of Staff had specifically recommended against the F-16 for Jordan, believing it had excess capability and that the F-20 would be more appropriate. In early December 1982 Jordan was expected to place the first order for 36 to 40 F-20's following a Joint Military Commission meeting between Jordan and the Americans on December 16 and a state visit by King Hussein on December 18-22. Jordan would spend $500 million in FY82 dollars for 40 aircraft. Instead King Hussein held out for the F-16. After years of political blockages, Jordan received 16 F-16 aircraft in the 1990's.

By near the end of the F-20 program in July 1986 ITAR clearance had been requested for the following additional countries that expressed interest in the aircraft:

• Argentina. In late 1982 the Reagan Administration viewed Latin America as a third market for the F-20, but one that would develop later than the Middle East and Southeast Asia markets. Argentina was interested in acquiring the F-20 at that time. However no official briefings were ever made.
• Australia. The Australians selected the F-18 in October 1981.
• Belgium. 49 additional F-16A/B were delivered from January 1988.
• Brazil. The country made no new fighter purchases after the 1980's.
• Cameroon. The country made no new fighter purchases after the 1980's.
• Chile: In late 1982 the Reagan Administration viewed Latin America as a third market for the F-20, but one that would develop later than the Middle East and Southeast Asia markets. Chile was interested in acquiring the F-20 at that time. However no official briefings were ever made.
• Denmark. The country made no new fighter purchases after the 1980's.
• Ecuador. The country made no new fighter purchases after the 1980's.
• Germany. The country participated in the Eurofighter program.
• India. This was the only country for which ITAR clearance was never received from 1980 to 1986. After the cancellation, talks were held in 1991 to hand over the F-20 design to India. They elected to consider with development of their indigenous Light Combat Aircraft instead.
• Israel
• Italy
• Japan
• Kuwait
• Mexico
• Morocco
• New Zealand
• Oman
• Peru
• Philippines
• Portugal
• Qatar
• Saudi Arabia: Test pilots from prospective foreign customer nations would begin flying the aircraft at Edwards in January 1983, including Saudi Arabia. Saudi decided to purchase additional British Tornado aircraft instead.
• Sweden: Sweden had an early interest in the F-5G, and a big-winged version informally dubbed the F-5S was briefed to them. Instead they proceeded with their own Gripen fighter program.
• Tunisia
• UAE
• UK
• Venezuela
• Yugoslavia